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Abstract—In cloud data center, shared storage with good
management is a main structure used for the storage of virtual
machines (VM). In this paper, we proposed Hybrid VM storage
(HVSTO), a privacy preserving shared storage system designed
for the virtual machine storage in large-scale cloud data center.
Unlike traditional shared storage, HVSTO adopts a distributed
structure to preserve privacy of virtual machines, which are
a threat in traditional centralized structure. To improve the
performance of I/O latency in this distributed structure, we use a
hybrid system to combine solid state disk and distributed storage.
From the evaluation of our demonstration system, HVSTO
provides a scalable and sufficient throughput for the platform
as a service infrastructure.
I. INTRODUCTION
In cloud data center, virtualization technology brings flex-
ibility and reliability to the cloud service [1] [2]. In Infras-
tructure as a Service (IaaS) and Platform as a Service (PaaS),
since virtual machines (VM) are the main interface to provide
cloud service to users [3], to protect the VM data is essential
to user privacy. In cloud data center, virtualization provides
effective data isolations [4]. Storage encapsulation is the main
method to isolate VM data in logical level. All data of each
VM are encapsulated to one or more disk image files stored
in a storage system [5].
However, it is not always secure for user privacy by this
encapsulation. To support VM management in cloud data
center, people use a shared storage in which all data of VM
are stored in a uniform storage space. To implement this
shared storage, existed works adopt centralized structure that
all physical nodes connect to a centralized storage unit like
NAS or other storage system [6]. Even it is convenient for
management with sufficient performance by adopting high-
end storage devices, centralized structure easily due to a data
leakage of all VM in the whole cloud data center when some
nodes with the access privilege are comprised. [7].
To prevent security issues of this centralized structure,
access control is used, which allows only the limited part of
the cloud data center has the right to access the centralized
storage [8]. It can prevent some malicious accesses from a
compromised node. While the access from physical nodes or
the administrator is allowed, , it is possible that the centralized
storage system is compromised to leak VM data in some worst
cases.
In this paper, we proposed HVSTO, a distributed storage
system for preserving privacy when some storage units are
compromised. We design a distributed structure to spread
security risks to multiple storage unit. Meanwhile, we design a
block mapping for each VM, with which the data of each VM
is distributed in each storage unit. A compromised storage unit
can only get a part of data on each VM. To preserve privacy,
HVSTO splits these data to small blocks and sparsely stored
in each storage unit. It is difficult to get information by using
parts of data blocks in one or several storage unit.
As the traditional address mapping is not suitable for the
distributed storage structure, we design a new tree-like map-
ping structure in HVSTO. HVSO also splits the mapping data
to small blocks and stores this blocks to the distributed storage
units sparsely. With this distribution, compromised nodes are
hard to get the full metadata of each VM image file, without
which it is hard to reorganize the blocks to data. Meanwhile,
with this mapping structure, a VM image is organized by a
version tree with extraordinary performance snapshot.
With the distributed structure which provides enough con-
currency for virtual machines, the latency is sometimes diffi-
cult to prevent since the block mapping and network trans-
ferring. In HVSTO, with a small block distribution, it is
hard to ignore the I/O latency from the distributed structure.
Traditional method to decrease this latency is used a high-end
network. In HVSTO, we adopt a low-cost method that adopts a
hybrid structure to combine the local solid state disk (SSD) and
the distributed structure. Although the maximum bandwidth
of the SSD device is limited, the high IOPS performance is
enough for supporting multiple VM concurrently access. In
HVSTO, local SSD stores the metadata, shared image data
and parts of branch data of each VM above it. From the
evaluation, the concurrency performance is improved by this
hybrid design.
The main contributions of this paper are summarized as
follows.
• First, we proposed HVSTO, a shared storage system with
a distributed structure to preserve privacy even parts of
storage units are compromised.
• Second, based on this distributed structure, we design a
new mapping structure for better privacy preserving and
high efficiency.
• Last, with the small block distribution, we design a hybrid
structure that combines the local SSD and distributed
storage units to provide better storage performance.
The rest of this paper is summarized as follows. We discuss
the threat model and design themes in Section II. The details
of design and implementation are discussed in Section III. In
Section IV, our evaluation is divided in two parts: first we
evaluate the overload on a single node and the concurrency
performance of a small cluster. The last sections offer some
concluding thoughts and future works.
II. PROBLEM STATEMENT
A. The System and Threat Model
Fig. 1. The threat model of the VM storage in cloud data center.
As shown in Fig. 1, we consider storage in a cloud data
center network involving four different entities: the user, who
considers their data are stored in VM; the virtual machine
(VM), who sends or receives storage request to the virtual
storage device; the virtual machine monitor (VMM), who
manages the virtual storage devices and transferring storage
I/O request to the center storage system as I/O request to the
image files; center storage system, in which all VM data are
stored.
In general case, each virtual machine has a virtual storage
device for I/O request in cloud data center. The virtual storage
device is encapsulated to a virtual disk image that is stored
in the storage system. When the user does something to their
operation system due to some I/O requests to the filesystem
in VM, VM sends the I/O requests to the virtual storage
device. VMM receives these requests from VM through the
virtual storage device and forward the request to the network
storage interface which connects the storage system. The
storage system processes these requests to the physical storage
devices.
In this model, a potential threat is all VM data are stored
in a centralized storage system logically in which all data
are accessible. If some compromised nodes in the cloud data
center get the access permission to this storage system, it is not
difficult to get all VM image files. Considering the limitation
of the hardware performance, VM image files are hard to
store in the storage system with encryption. As a result, this
malicious access can easily analyze the detail of VM image
file, which leads to a leakage of user privacy.
B. Design Goals
We define three different design themes as following to
reduce the leakage risk of user privacy without decreasing the
performance
1) Disributed Shared Storage: As mentioned before, cen-
tralized storage is the main defect to the threat. Even using
access control or other defense methods, it has an obligation to
open the access permission to some nodes like virtualization
servers to execute VM and the manage nodes who control the
behavior of VM like migration, snapshot or other essential
operations. It is hard to negative the probable threat that a node
with the access privilege to the storage system is compromised.
A feasible method to vanish this threat is using a different
storage structure. As a result, we use a distributed structure to
store VM images in HVSTO.
Although dividing VM data to multiple storage units re-
duces the leaked data in the worst case, it harm to the
scalability of resource management. It is hard to schedule
storage resources except moving whole VM image data from
one storage unit to another. In HVSTO, we design a shared
space to provide a same storage space to each virtualization
server while VM data are sliced to small blocks and distributed
sparsely in multiple storage nodes. Therefore, it becomes
almost impossible to get the VM data though a pile of small
discrete blocks on one or several compromised storage nodes.
2) Efficient Mapping: Conventional virtual machines stor-
age solutions like VMDK [9] or QCOW [10] were using a
”chain” mapping to realize benefits of virtual disks. In this
”chain”, each version of the original disk file will store the
increment and a point to the former version means an I/O
request to source disk data on the N version will jump N
times. It is not an obvious problem with existed high-end
storage system which provides adequate performance includes
low latency access. In HVSTO, this version control is not
suited to the distributed storage that the access between storage
node and virtualization server is slower than high-end storage
system.
Meanwhile, actually, the ”chain” mapping is based on the
sequential storage which is easy to locate the rest of the data
with one address of the block in an image. If the compromised
node gets one or more block addresses, the attacker can get
more VM data easily. In HVSTO, instead the ”chain” mapping,
we design an efficient direct index metadata for mapping a
virtual block to a physical block. Based on these structures,
with the generally disk image reconsidered on a map of non-
sequential blocks, using parts of mapped addresses is hard to
get other VM data.
3) Hybrid structure: We design a hybrid storage structure
combined by a local solid-state disk equipped with every
node of virtualization cluster and the distributed storage. As
mentioned before, since serial access module of the general
mechanical disks, their limited concurrency performance could
not support enough virtual machines. Storage service devices
increase could remit the pressure of concurrency access from
virtual machines in PaaS. Another efficient method is using
the local storage devices equipped in virtualization nodes.
In most virtualization implementations, it is necessary to
equip enough capacity storage device for installation some re-
quired components like a virtual machine monitor(VMM) [11].
We combine these devices with the shared distributed storage
for increasing the data I/O throughput. Consider throughput
from tens of virtual machines in a single virtualization node,
we choose the solid state disk that a flash based storage device
without any mechanistic structure. With the characteristics of
SSD, the random I/O throughput is thousands of times than
the traditional hard disk. This feature meets the demand of
storage virtualization [12].
C. Security Analysis of Distribution
To better understand the better security of the distribution
structure, we analyze the possibility of user data leakage in a
small case.
Firstly, we introduce a small case in cloud data center for
our analysis. There a small cloud data center with M VMs
and H private data existed in these VMs. To a private data di,
we use li to denote the data size.
Then we define the pi to denote the possibility of the
leakage of data i. Therefore, we get the possibility pi when
the storage system is compromised in a centralized storage
system. Oblivious, this possibility is 100% since the li size of
data are obtained by scan the whole storage system.
After that, we adopt our distributed design of storage
system. In this storage system, all image files are sliced to
small blocks and distributed to N storage nodes. We define s
to denote the size of each block. Considering a simple random
distribution, we get the possibility of a block stored in one of
n specific storage node is n
N
.
Therefore, to get a private data i, the malicious application
needs to get ni blocks to recovery the content of these data.
The definition of ni is shown in (1).
ni =
{
li
s
if li ≥ s
1 if li < s
(1)
Considering the distribution of each block is a separate
event, as shown as in (2), we easily get the possibility pi
that the private data i are leaked when n storage nodes are
compromised.
pi =
{
( n
N
)
li
s if li ≥ s
n
N
if li < s
(2)
Therefore, we get the total size P of leakage data when n
storage nodes are compromised as shown as in 3.
P =
H∑
i=1
pili =
H∑
i=1
(
n
N
)ni li (3)
To evaluate the security of our system, we take a simulation
based on several traces of real world user data. We describe
the detail of this simulation in Section IV.
III. DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION
A. System Architecture
Fig. 2. Hivo consist of the storage appliance in virtualization servers and
the shared distributed storage(SDS)
As shown in Fig. 2., HVSTO consist of shared distributed
storage (SDS) and local storage appliance. SDS is a group of
commercial computers equipped generally storage devices and
the virtual block interface daemon. Local storage appliance is
a toolkit for redirecting the I/O requests from virtual machines
to the SDS and management of local SSD cache.
HVSTO provides a virtual disk interface for each VM
executing upon the virtualization servers accessing the storage
transparently. HVSTO uses a block index structure instead
of the traditional file abstraction to manage each virtual disk
image. As the general file storage, to access data in HVSTO,
it is necessary to inquiry the metadata stored in the SDS.
Metadata and data are both managed by the local storage
appliance.
The local appliance on the host VM gets all I/O requests
from virtual machines then transfer these requests through
general TCP/IP networks to the storage nodes in SDS or access
the local SSD if the destination data of these requests were
cached. Since the isolation of virtualization, these procedure
is agnostic to the operation system in each VM.
The virtual block interface daemon accepts the network
package from the local storage appliances and processes these
requests to final storage devices. For the design of a distributed
structure, in virtual block interface daemon, we design three
steps of processing I/O requests from virtualization servers.
First, the interface daemon calculate the destination nodes of
the request data block. Second, the interface daemon transfer
each request to the destination nodes. Last, daemon process
requests to the blocks contained in the local node.
B. Meta-data
In some newer design, a block direct index of virtual disks
was used for a better performance in virtual machines storages.
Fig. 3. The Meta-data Structure and Snapshot Procedure of HVSTO
By this method, each block in each version of virtual disks
is mapped to the physical block in an index data structure.
It is avoided that the linear increased delay of processing I/O
request in a deep version tree. Since the benefit on performance
of the block direct index, we choose a similar way in HVSTO.
In a procedure of sending each request of a virtual block to
the mapped physical one, we found the time overhead occur in
the seeking disk for index data both direct index or c¨hainı¨ndex
and repeatedly reading disk when using the letter is the reason
of linear performance decrease. But after disk seeking, the
data read time is unremarkable. So we adopted a B+tree like
structure from database systems to index the virtual block to
physical.
The nodes in tree are in various sizes as mentioned in Fig. 3.
We take a three depth B+tree for mapping virtual block to the
space in distributed storage. Based on this B+tree, for the disk
image snapshot, we implement a copy-on-write mechanism.
When a snapshot is taken, a new image root is created and a
read-only link will be set to leaf of the previous root. When
virtual machine generates a new block, HVSTO will construct
a writeable link and the non-leaf nodes to this block. The
other link of new non-leaf nodes will be set read-only to the
corresponding child in the previous B+tree structure. And the
newest image root will be set writeable and the previous tree
will be set read-only in the snapshot log. With this efficient
snapshot, in HVSTO, we design a rewrite avoidance in I/O
processing. When the VM wants to change the data in its
image, HVSTO takes a snapshot of the current image and
generate a new version to store the new data. The rewrite
avoidance significantly simplifies the processing of the rewrite
request. We also design and implement a garbage collection
to remove the automatically generated version when low load
periods.
C. Data in SSD
HVSTO has three different types of blocks, metadata,
system image and activity data. Since the limited space of local
storage, SSD stored a part of data of virtual machines on the
virtualization machine. We divide the local SSD storage space
to three distinguished parts for storing this different data and
implement different replacement strategies. In the SSD device,
we set 25% storage space for caching the metadata, 50% for
system image and the rest for active data.
With rewrite avoidance, in the period of system service, the
meta-data size will increase since more and more snapshot
of VM file systems. We modify the Least Recently Used
(LRU) cache replacement strategy to the metadata in two
stages. First, scan the latest version of disk images used by
all upon virtual machines and label these blocks cache index
as protected. Second, remove the last element unprotected of
the LRU queue. Since we set each image index should be
accessed by a single VM strictly, the cached metadata update
only takes place in write-back.
To release the concurrent access pressure during some
determinable periods like booting VM, local SSD caches parts
of source VM images. The contents in these images are
only changed by the administrator in system upgrading or
exceptional cases. However, with various VM existed in the
whole cloud, the storage space in SSD is limited to store all
source image. When some VMs migrate in or boot up, it is
needed to updata this part of SSD space. We adopt LIRS cache
[13] to manage this space to guarantee as many essential data
stored in local as possible during the peak load.
The active data space caches the read/write data of active
VM. These VMs have their read/write cache space. For the
read cache, we implement prefetch and replacement strategy
refereed by the Linux kernel file cache with a larger prefetch
window. HVSTO provides a 100MB write cache in SSD for
each active VM. As mentioned before to implement rewrite
avoidance, HVSTO update the metadata more frequently. To
reduce this update, new version is created until the write cache
full or VM is saved/migrated.
IV. EVALUATION
As we described in the past sections, HVSTO has some
special features supports VM storage in cloud environment. To
confirm these features, we evaluate HVSTO in two different
perspective.
A. Data Privacy Simulation
In this section, we firstly evaluate the security efficiency
of HVSTO by simulation with some trace of real word user
data. Then we take some tests to evaluate the performance of
HVSTO. We trace user files in
My Documents of Windows 7 of 10 student computers in our
laboratory and record the file name and size (About 20.86GB
totally). We consider there 100 storage nodes of the small
cloud data center and the block size is 4KB and 8KB. Then
we put these records to calculate the leaked data ratio these
10 users if they are using cloud services instead their personal
computers. We calculate the leakage ratio from 1 to 25 nodes
are compromised.
As shown in Fig. 4, we find that the leakage ratio of user
data after storage system is intruded is very small with the
design of HVSTO. When one storage node is compromised
in HVSTO with 4KB block size, the leakage ratio is only
Fig. 4. The user data leakage ratio when 1 to 25 are compromised.
0.0033% or it is possible to leak about 65.6KB user data.
While the block size becomes 8KB, the possible leakage ratio
is 0.0074%. If more nodes are compromised, the possilbe leak-
age ratio becomes higher. When 1
4
nodes are compromised,
it is possible to leak about 2.45MB user data, which means
leakage is more than 0.11% with 4KB block size while the
possible leakage ratio becomes 0.25% with 8KB block size.
Even though there are a few of data could be leaked when
some storage nodes are compromised, HVSTO is much better
than the single storage system which has 100% leakage ratio
after it is compromised.
B. Testing Configuration
To measure the efficiency of HVSTO, we test HVSTO in
two different persecutive. We design a micro benchmark to
find the effects brought by each design and implementation.
All test is taken in a 7 nodes cluster with commercial blade
servers. In this cluster, each node equips two 1.6Ghz Intel
Xeon E5310 quad core processors, 4 GByte of RAM, an
Intel 40GB X25-V SSD, a 500GB HDD and an Intel e1000
GbE network interface cards. All servers are connected by
a TP-LINK TL-SF1016D switch. As the comparison system,
we choose one node with NFS protocol [14] to provide
the centralized storage service. To the micro benchmark, we
choose two nodes that one node as the virtualization server
and the other as the storage node to test the I/O latency. To
the overall performance test, all 7 nodes are used. In all test,
the software environment is the same. We install XCP 1.6 with
CentOS 6.3 on each node and use Fedora 15 without GUI as
the OS of guest VM.
C. Micro Benchmark
In this persecutive, based on this mapping structure and
hybrid design, we test the I/O latency brought by distributed
design with mapping structure and hybrid design. Then, we
measure the performance degradation of the distributed struc-
ture than general local storage devices.
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Fig. 5. The read latency after snapshot of HVSTO and general QCOW
format image
1) I/O Latency: As mentioned in Section II, with the
distributed structure, the I/O latency in HVSTO is bigger
than general storage system. We adopt a Hybrid structure
to optimize this latency. Meanwhile, in our design themes,
we describe the mapping structure in HVSTO provides better
snapshot performance to support some advance features for
the virtualized storage.
Therefore, we measure the I/O latency of HVSTO with
version control. We describe the test steps as following.
Initially, we choose a VM image and take a snapshot to this
VM image in HVSTO. We set this snapshot as a version of
VM image. Then, we run a VM with this version and test the
latency by recording the average I/O latency of reading same
2MB data in 5 times. After that, we take snapshot to this
version to generate a new version and repeat the same test. In
latency test, we repeat the test steps 10 times and get the test
result from 10 versions of VM image. As a comparison, we
take the same test on NFS. We put the same image in NFS
and take snapshot on this image by QCOW.
From the result in Fig. 5, in the source image, with the
overload of HVSTO, the latency is bigger than NFS. In the
image after 2 times snapshot, the latency of HVSTO is near the
QCOW. With the cached data in local SSD, we find the latency
is decreased in the image after 3 times snapshot. With more
snapshot, the latency of QCOW snapshot is linear increased
and HVSTO is almost stable value. From the result of latency
test comparing with the NFS, we consider the I/O latency
increased by HVSTO is not obvious. In addition, with the
mapping structure and hybrid design, to the original QCOW,
HVSTO performs better I/O latency of the image after more
3 times snapshot to the source image.
2) Throughput: Since our implementation of virtual block
mapping, there is a performance degradation from the original
network filesystem. We test the throughput to find out the
overload by the HVSTO design. We choose bonnie++ [15]
as the mainly benchmark application to measure the general
sequential I/O performance. We run a VM in HVSTO and
excute bonnie++ in this VM. As a comparison to find the
performance degradation by virtualization and HVSTO, we
run the test in a physical node with native NFS and a VM
with NFS. As shown in Fig. 6, the NFSGuest means VM
image is stored in NFS and the NFSHost means native NFS.
From the test result, compared with the performance of
native NFS, we find HVSTO has a degradation at 6% for
write throughput performance and 7% for read throughput
while the VM with NFS has a degradation of 3% for write
and 4% for read. With the filesystem cache, HVSTO has a
better result that the degradation is 6% for write throughput
and 5% for read. To the VM with NFS, the degradation is 3%
and 4%. Since the result with cache is better to measure the
performance of storage system in practical usage, we consider
that the overload to a VM in HVSTO design is not obvious
with the original virtualized disk image.
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Fig. 6. The Bonnie++ Output results on different storage devices
D. Performance Test
In this part, we test the concurrency access performance
which is essential to a large scaled cloud data center. Then,
to indicate the efficiency of the distributed structure, we find
the system scalability by test the system throughput with the
different number of storage nodes.
1) Concurrency Access: We test the concurrency perfor-
mance through reappearing the peak load happens. Boot storm
[16] is a common peak load in existed cloud data center.
We choose multiple VM booting in the same time as the
test scenario. We boot 1 to 11 virtual machines on one
virtualization server in HVSTO with or without local cache.
We also measure the same test using NFS as a comparison.
Then we record the time from the beginning to the end. We
use a shell script to boot these VM simultaneously and sends
a signal after all VM booted. We record the system time when
the first VM begins booting and the last VM finishes booting.
And the interval of this two time is the booting time.
0 2 4 6 8 10 12
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
B
oo
tin
g 
Ti
m
e 
(s
)
Number of Virtual Machines
 With Local Cache
 Without Local Cache
 NFS
Fig. 7. The Bonnie++ Output results on different storage devices
Fig. 8. The booting time with system image cache is better than NFS and
HVSTO without cache
From the results shown in Fig. 8, we find that HVSTO
perform much shorter booting time than NFS. More additional
time is cost with NFS when booting more VM. Additionally,
with the local cache, the time is shorter than HVSTO without
local cache. Therefore, we consider that multiple nodes in
HVSTO provides higher concurrent performance than single
NFS node and the performance is increased obviously by
hybrid structure.
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Fig. 9. The Postmark results on different storage devices
2) Scalability: We obtained eight blade servers whose the
equipments mentioned before to test the scalability of HVSTO
in clusters. In these eight blade servers, we select 3 nodes as
the virtualization servers and other 4 as the storage nodes. We
execute postmark [17] in each virtual machine concurrently
and there are 4 VM on every virtualization server. We record
the total performance of all VM in one virtualization server
(virtual server) during serving 1-way, 2-way and 3-way virtu-
alization servers.
From the result in Fig. 9, the plot of the postmark transaction
performance reflects that the throughput capacity of the storage
network is increased with the storage nodes. When serving 1-
way virtualization server, the transactions per second are from
63 to 287 with increasing the number of storage nodes from
1 to 5. When serving 2-way servers, the result is from 109
to 456 and the result of 3-way servers is 205 to 842. From
previous fileystem benchmark, the postmark performance of
ext3 filesystem on general hard disk is approximately 300
transactions per second, we consider that HVSTO can provide
same performance when the number of virtualization servers
to storage nodes is more than 3:5.
V. CONCLUSION
To solve the privacy threat brought by centralized storage
structure in the cloud data center, we propose HVSTO, a
distributed storage system for virtual machines. With a spec-
ified design of mapping structure, HVSTO provides better
privacy protection and efficient snapshot than original VM
image structure. To solve the performance degradation of
distributed structure, we adopt a hybrid structure that keep
more VM data in local SSD storage to reduce the network
interactions. We implement three types of cache in this local
SSD storage and the evaluation indicate this cache increase
the performance of HVSTO. Considering HVSTO is just a
demonstration implement, we will continue to improve the
design of HVSTO include better block distribution algorithm,
strict access control to virtualization server and scheduling
storage resource dynamically.
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